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Abstract
This paper takes the theoretical model Professor Catherine Rogers developed in her article “Fit
and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration,” 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002) as the starting point for an original argument that conflicts of laws
analysis should be used to determine which legal ethics rules should apply to lawyers practicing
international arbitration. The argument is supported by the new ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct rule on choice of law explicitly applies conflicts of laws analysis to
lawyers practicing in the multijurisdictional settings. This paper analyses the new ABA Model
Rule and its impact on lawyers practicing in international arbitration.
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Peace is Not the Absence of Conflict:*
A Response to Professor Rogers’ Article “Fit and Function in Legal Ethics”
Introduction
International arbitration has become the preeminent way in which transnational business
disputes are adjudicated.1 As the field of arbitration expands and diversifies,2 the question as to
how the lawyers who represent parties to these disputes can and should best be regulated has
come to the forefront.
Suppose a German and an American lawyer represent opposing sides in an arbitration:
The German professional ethics rule prohibits the lawyer from speaking with witnesses before
the hearing, because such communications would constitute “witness tampering.”3

The

American rule not only permits pre-testimonial communications, but arguably requires that the
lawyer engage in such “witness preparation.”4

Which ethical rules should apply to these

lawyers?
Professor Catherine A. Rogers sets out to answer this question in her article “Fit and
Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration.”5 Rogers
proposes a novel methodology, which she calls the “functional approach,” that is designed to
develop the substantive content of the rules of professional conduct to govern in the context of
international arbitration. In a companion article, Rogers’ proposes that these rules should be

*

“Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of creative alternatives for responding to conflict.” Dorothy Thompson.
Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
9, 12 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadows, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What’s Happening and What’s
Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 949 (2002). See also, Susan L. Karamanian, Overstating the "Americanization" of International Arbitration:
Lessons from ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 5, 33 (2003); Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need For More
Governance?, 90 A.J.I.L. 250, 261 (1996).
2
Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice – Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer
at All?, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 715 (1995) (noting the expansion of multijurisdictional practice); Richard Abel, The Future of the Legal Profession:
Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994) (describing trends in globalization of legal practice).
3
Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L.341, 359, n.84 (2002) (using the terms “witness tampering” and “witness preparation”). This example is also discussed in Detlev Vagts,
Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 688 (2000).
4
Rogers, supra note 3, at 359.
5
Rogers, supra note 3.
1
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promulgated and enforced by the arbitral tribunals themselves.6
This paper evaluates the “functional approach” and concludes that it is not necessary to
derive a wholly new set of rules of professional conduct for lawyers practicing international
arbitration. This paper argues, instead, that currently extant professional rules and disciplinary
institutions are sufficient to regulate attorneys practicing in international arbitration and that a
conflicts of laws approach is the best approach to lawyer regulation in that context.
In Part I, I outline Rogers’ functional approach and describe the way in which it derives
the content of the ethical rules governing lawyers from the “functional role” in a particular
context. In laying the foundation for her novel theory, Rogers rejects several alternative methods
for ascertaining ethical rules for lawyers in international arbitration, including the conflicts of
laws approach. I review Rogers’ critique of the choice of law approach at the end of Part I. In
Part II, I argue that the conflicts of law approach is not only a feasible solution, but, in fact,
provides the best answer to the question of which rules should govern lawyers practicing in
international arbitration. First, I provide an alternative description of the differences between
national legal ethics regimes, which does not require the conclusion that lawyers play
fundamentally different roles in these regimes. Then I argue that national ethical regulation
already provides for application of conflicts of laws principles in the context of international
arbitration.

Finally, I analyze the conceptual reasons, including independence of the legal

profession and co-equal sovereignty of nations under international law, that support the
application of conflict of laws doctrine. In Part III, I apply a conflicts of laws approach to a few
of Rogers’ examples as well as those of other scholars who have addressed these issues in order
6

Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for
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to demonstrate the practicability of the approach.
I.

Rogers Claims the Functional Approach Provides the Only Viable Methodology for
Developing the Content of Ethical Rules in International Arbitration.
Rogers provides two different formulations of the problem of lawyer regulation in

international regulation: Either international arbitration is an “ethical no man’s land” where
lawyers are not subject to any regulation at all, or lawyers practicing in international arbitration
are subject to multiple regulatory regimes so that it is unclear which ethical rules they should
follow.7

Furthermore, even if there is not an obvious conflict, such as the witness

preparation/tampering example, there is always an implicit conflict among lawyers from
different jurisdictions simply because they have different “professional habits” that structure the
ways in which they practice.8 Compliance with ethical rules can have significant effects on the
substantive outcome of the arbitration—if the American lawyer prepares her witnesses, but the
German lawyer does not, the American client may well fare better. In order for a proceeding to
be fair, all attorneys involved must be “playing by the same rules.”9 Under Rogers’ theory,
either formulation of the problem requires the same solution, namely, a self-sufficient code of
ethics for lawyers engaged in international arbitration.

International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).
7
Rogers, supra note 3, at 343; Rogers, supra note 7, at 2-3 (“[A]ttorneys in an international arbitration are either each abiding by
different and often conflicting national ethical rules, or are engaging in a completely unregulated ethical free-for-all.”)
8
Id. at 357. See also Sheila Block, Ethics in International Proceedings, INT’L LITIG. NEWS, (Int’l Bar Ass’n), Oct. 2004, at 15, 18
(noting that “it may be hard for lawyers in some jurisdictions to get used to” regulations that differ from the rules to which they are accustomed,
clear regulations are preferable.)
9
Rogers, supra note 3, at 346. Cf. Daly, supra note 3, at 757.
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The “Functional Approach” Derives Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Role.

Rogers’ theory describes ethics as inextricably dependent on the lawyer’s role.10 Rogers
insists that this is a “conceptual analysis” of ethical rules and not an account of their historical
origins.11 The first part of the functional approach describes the “universal” structure of the
lawyer’s role. The second situates that role in the context of the procedural and the ethical rules
of a justice system.
1.

The Ethical Obligations of a Lawyer Are Derived from Her Role, Which
Is Determined by the Procedural Framework of Her Legal System.

Rogers argues that the ethical obligations of any particular person under a particular
circumstance are inherently bound up with her “role” and can only be determined in the context
of that role.12 She illustrates with the example of the obligation to take care of a child—the
child’s mother has an ethical obligation to feed the child, whereas an unrelated person in a far
away place may not.13 However, while a role guides conduct, it does not fully determine the
corresponding ethical obligations. To extend the example, while the mother’s role creates an
affirmative duty to feed the child, that role does not specify when, what or how she should feed
it. Since the lawyer’s role is more complex and nuanced than can be fully captured within any
set of ethical rules, no matter how comprehensive, professional codes of conduct are best viewed
as “mak[ing] certain choices impermissible and fram[ing] the inquiry for other choices.”14
Legal ethics is complex because the lawyer’s role “rests on an inherent contradiction,” in

10
Rogers, supra note 3, at 387 (“The thesis of the functional approach is that ethical regimes are tied to the inter-relational roles
performed by actors ... in different systems”).
11
Id. at 380 n.188.
12
Id. at 382.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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that it encompasses obligations both to the public as well as to the client.15 Legal ethics is
situated on the continuum between law and ethics, professional and moral responsibility. Given
the premise that ethics are inextricably connected to role, Rogers identifies several “universal
features” and “core principles” that, in varying proportions, define the contours of the lawyer’s
role in any judicial system.16 These values include: truthfulness, fairness, independence, loyalty
and confidentiality.17 The essence of any advocate’s role is the particular balance it strikes
between the advocate’s obligations to the client (as manifested in loyalty and confidentiality) and
her obligations to the public, the profession, and the courts (truthfulness and fairness). The
lawyer’s role in any given society rests somewhere along the continuum between “officer of the
court” and “zealous advocate.”18
The second part of the functional approach situates this “generic” role structure the
context of the cultural values of the society, and the procedural, evidentiary and ethical rules of
that society’s justice system.19 Rogers argues that a code of legal ethics represents the final
culmination of a developmental progression that begins with the cultural values of a society.
The cultural values of a society give rise to the procedural and evidentiary rules of the justice
system.20 The procedural and evidence rules in turn determine the lawyer’s role by “dictat[ing]
the specific activities through which the lawyer will perform [their advocacy obligations].”21
Finally, that role is expressed in the ethical code. Rogers strongly emphasizes that the lawyer’s
role in the justice system precedes the ethical code even as it may be “defin[ed]’ by that code.”22

15

Id. at 383. See also Vagts, supra note 3, at 686 (“The tension between keeping clients' confidences and assuring honesty and legality
is resolved in different ways if one sees lawyers as court officers or as client caretakers.”)
16
Rogers, supra note 3, at 384.
17
Id. at 358–71.
18
Cf. Vagts supra note 3, at 686 (discussing the differences between cultures that emphasize the lawyer’s function as an “officer of the
court” function as opposed to those which emphasize the lawyer’s obligation to the client).
19
Rogers, supra note 3, at 385.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 383.
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In comparing legal ethics across national boundaries, then, Rogers suggests that we should think
about “national ethical regimes ... as reflecting procedurally-determined and culturally-bound
differences” in the lawyer’s roles in those various countries.
2.

The Relationship Between “Role” and “Rules” Described by the
Functional Approach Explains the Differences Between Civil and
Common Law Systems.

Rogers moves on to “prove” her theory by using it to describe differences between the
US and German legal systems.23 She characterizes the US judicial system as founded on values
of “individualism” and “due process.”24 These values lead to a framework of procedural and
evidentiary rules that allow each party to present his case to a neutral judge whose decisions
ultimately make law.25 In this context, the lawyer is a “strategist,” who presents the facts of the
case and the supporting precedent in the light most favorable to her client, and a “lobbyist,” who
persuades the judge of the way the law should be. The lawyer’s role is weighted to the zealous
advocacy side of the continuum. This role determines that the ethical rules will encourage
conduct that will further client-based strategy and advocacy, including, for example, witness
preparation.
The German culture, on the other hand, is characterized by a “greater acceptance of
authority and less tolerance for certainty.”26 Those values lead to a set of procedural and
evidentiary rules that places the judge at the helm where he actively runs the fact-finding
process, including interrogating the parties’ witnesses, and then applies the civil code to these
facts. In this system, the lawyer is not a strategist, and certainly not a lobbyist, but rather a

23
Id. at 387. See also, Vagts, supra note 3, at 687 (noting that “[w]hile comparisons between Anglo-American and Continental legal
systems as being adversarial as opposed to inquisitorial are regarded as oversimplified by the experts, they sill provide a useful contrast for
comparative purposes.”).
24
Id. at 394.
25
Rogers, supra note 3, at 390 (describing the US system as “a model of party contest before a ‘judicial tabula rasa’”).
26
Id.
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“guide” to the court, a collaborator with the judge in a mutual quest for resolution of the issue.27
This role requires an ethical rule that prohibits lawyers from tampering with witnesses, because
such conduct would undermine the judge’s access to unadulterated evidence.
3.

The Functional Approach Can Prescribe the Content of the Rules for
International Arbitration.

The purpose of the functional approach is, of course, to formulate a set of professional
ethics rules to govern lawyers practicing in international arbitration, thus filling the void of
regulation Rogers identifies in this area.
In order to derive the content of the ethical rules from the role of the lawyer in the
international arbitration system, Rogers looks first to the underlying “cultural values” of
international arbitration. While she concedes that international arbitration is “a system of dispute
resolution without geographic borders or a discernible citizenry” such that it doesn’t have
“cultural values” per se, she nevertheless maintains that international arbitration has “distinctive
normative goals” that provide the basis for the procedural and, ultimately, ethical rules of that
system.28 These normative goals include: neutrality, effective resolution of disputes, and party
autonomy.29 Because international arbitration has these qualities, businesses often select it as the
mandatory form of dispute resolution in their initial contracts. Arbitration provides a more
neutral venue than the national court of any of the parties.30 Arbitral awards are not appealable
enforceable in nearly any jurisdiction, under international treaties, such as the New York
Convention.31 Arbitrators typically have particularized knowledge of the industry or terms of the
dispute so that they have a unique ability to adjudicate the fine subtleties of the dispute in the

27

Id. at 389.
Id. at 408.
29
Id. at 408–411.
30
Smit, supra note 1, at 11.
31
Id. at 10.
28
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most equitable manner (and not necessarily one dictated by precedent).32 As a private regime,
the parties control which issues are addressed as well as the procedures followed by the
tribunal.33
Although parties are entitled to determine the procedures used in their arbitral
proceedings,34 default procedures have been adopted by the International Bar Association
(“IBA”).35 Rogers makes much of these “hybridized” procedures and claims that they flow from
the normative goals of the international arbitration system. In my opinion, the more ready
explanation is that the hybrid procedures represent a compromise between the civil and common
law procedural frameworks to which the lawyers practicing in international arbitration are
accustomed.36 That contention is addressed in detail in Part II, below. According to Rogers,
however, the fact that the hybrid procedures allow for a fair amount of US-style lawyer
advocacy, including direct and cross-examination of witnesses, represents the expression of
arbitration’s normative goal of party autonomy.
The final step in the functional approach is, of course, to derive ethical rules from the
lawyer’s role as it is shaped by procedure. The hybrid arbitral procedures create a role for the
lawyer in which “the attorney’s sphere or obligation to the client must be expanded over that of
the classic civil law system, but not nearly to the dimensions of the US system.”37 Specifically,
Rogers notes that the procedural rules allow for introduction of prepared witness statements and
a certain amount of cross-examination.38

32

She infers that the ethical rules “must therefore

Rogers, supra note 3, at 408 n.319.
Id. at 11, 12
Smit, supra note 1, at 12 n. 11.
35
Rogers, supra note 3, at 414.
36
Id. at 416 n.362; see also, notes 83–92 and accompanying text, infra.
37
Id. at 418.
38
Id. See also, Rogers, supra note 6, at 27.
33
34
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accommodate some pre-testimonial communication with witnesses.”39 The functional approach
requires that ethical rules agree with the procedural framework and that they account for and
flow from the lawyer’s role in the particular justice system.
B.

Conflicts of Law Doctrine Cannot Provide Ethics Rules for International
Arbitration Because it Does Not Account for the Lawyer’s Unique Role in That
Setting.

Rogers addresses several alternative ways of coming up with rules of professional
responsibility for international arbitration and declares them all “implausible.”40 I will only
address her brief critique of conflicts of laws here.
The conflicts of law discussion is only relevant to international arbitration in the event
that national ethics regimes apply in that context. If it is truly the case that international
arbitration is void of professional regulation, conflicts of laws doctrine will not get us anywhere.
Rogers’ insists that national regulation does not apply, based on a prior formulation of ABA
Model Rule 8.5 that “expressly disavow[ed] application in the international context.”41 As I will
discuss below, the rule has been changed and now expressly does apply to international practice.
This change nullifies Rogers’ initial argument that there is no conflict between national laws to
resolve because they don’t apply in the first instance.
In the case national ethics rules do apply to lawyers engaged in an international
arbitration, Rogers gives several reasons why conflicts of law does not provide a satisfactory
solution. Her primary critique is that international arbitration and the role of its lawyers have
“unique features” and differ “at an organic level” from national courts and their lawyers.42 These
differences render ethics rules devised to fit the function of lawyers in national courts

39

Rogers, supra note 3, at 418.
Id. at 395.
41
Id. at 356–357 nn. 71–73 & 403 n.296. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1993).
42
Id. at 402, n.304.
40
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inapplicable to international arbitration. Essentially, she argues that the unique role of the
international arbitration lawyer requires unique ethics rules. To expose the “untenab[ility]” of
conflicts of law in this arena, Rogers describes a situation in which the procedures chosen for the
arbitration allowed for American-style discovery, but the ethics rule selected by choice of law
did not privilege attorney-client communications.43 The untenable result is that attorney-client
communications would be discoverable. As I will illustrate in Part III of this paper, proper
application of conflicts doctrine should not produce such results.
Rogers further points out that national ethics rules do not provide guidance for all of the
circumstances found in international arbitration, including selection of the arbitrator. She claims
the “time-cost” of filling these gaps on an ad hoc basis is “prohibitive.”44 Finally, she notes that
conflicts of laws are “unsettled ... in many legal systems,” so that there is a danger that they
would be hard to agree upon and their application would be “unpredictable” and “potentially
detrimental.”45 This is not a criticism of the fundamentals of conflicts of law, but rather a
suspicion that it will not be applied properly. Rogers fundamental criticisms of conflicts of law
rest firmly on the assumption that international arbitration is unique and so requires a “specially
tailored” ethics code. In the next Part of this paper, I will provide an alternate explanation of
national ethical codes and the procedural framework of international arbitration that renders the
application of conflicts of law to ethics rules in that context not only plausible but necessary.
III.

Conflicts of Laws Doctrine Accounts for the Relevant Regulatory Interests Better Than
Does Rogers’ Functional Approach.
Rogers’ theory, as described above, depends on the factual assessment that international

43

Id. at 402.
Id. at 404.
45
Id. at 405 n.305.
44
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arbitration takes place in “an a-national space.”46 She argues that nationally based professional
regulation does not reach lawyers’ conduct in international arbitration. I argue in this Part that
both of this premises is false, as evidenced by the new version of the ABA Model Rule 8.5 and
the European Community Professional Ethics Code (the CCBE), and as supported by the
principles of the co-equal sovereignty of nations and the independence of the legal profession.
Conflicts of laws provides a way to apply extant ethical regimes and disciplinary systems to
international arbitration. I will argue that this is a theoretically more sound solution than Rogers’
recommendation that institution-specific ethical rules be derived by way of the functional
method.
I will begin by reformulating the problem as one of notice rather than conflicting rules.
For example, take the pre-testimonial communications rules discussed above.

Instead of

focusing on the difference between the rules the two sides are accustomed to following, I would
like to note that the unfair result only occurs in the situation in which the American lawyer
prepares her witnesses and the German lawyer does not.

If both sides knew about the

discrepancy, this would never come to pass. In that case, the German lawyer would protest
against the inequity, and the American lawyer would insist on her right and duty to go forward
with her preparation. The parties and the tribunal would be forced to resolve the disagreement in
some manner. The problem is one of notice: The American and German lawyer must know
about and adhere to the same standard in order to ensure that the proceeding is equitable and fair.
Furthermore, lawyers in international arbitration need to know which ethics rules will be applied
to their conduct in the event of an eventual disciplinary action.47

46

Id. at 356.
Block, supra note 8 (emphasizing the practical problem lawyers face in deciding what ethical rules to follow in international
proceedings). As Professor Detlev Vagts notes, “questions of lawyer behavior in international situations may have to be determined in the
context of professional disciplinary proceedings.” Vagts, supra note 3, at 688.
47
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Whereas Rogers states that “[a]ttorneys remain subject to often conflicting professional
obligations,”48 I insist that attorneys are actually only subject to one set of professional
obligations. The problem is that it may not be clear to them which obligations they are subject
to. Rogers concludes that “[a] code is needed to get all the participants playing by the same
rules.”49 To which I respond that a level playing field can also be achieved by notifying all
counsel of the applicable ethical rules. The playing field will just as level if the American lawyer
is told that the German rule on pre-testimonial communications governs in a particular case.
Rogers concedes this point with respect to cross-border practice when she states “[f]or regulation
of cross-border practice, conflict-of-law rules may in fact be appropriate, as long as they are
clear in their application.”50

But she does not explain why arbitration should be treated

differently than other cross-border practice. As long as we can provide practitioners with notice
as to which ethics rules apply to them, the playing field will be leveled and the dilemmas faced
by lawyers in international arbitration will be resolved. Conflicts of laws doctrine provides the
necessary notice.
A.

The Differences Among National Ethics Rules Are Best Explained Historically.

I would replace Rogers’ “conceptual” analysis of legal ethics with a comparative,
historical analysis. Ethical rules best understood, not in terms of the concept of the lawyer’s
role, but rather as a historical contingency that operates in tandem with the procedural and other
features of a legal system to express the lawyer’s role within it. The development of detailed
ethics rules in the US took place over the course of nearly one hundred years, instigated and

48

Rogers, supra note 3, at 346.
Id.
50
Id. at 398 n.276.
49
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propelled by various forces that changed the way in which legal services were provided.51
Similarly, legal ethics in European countries and the EU have developed over the past few
decades, including the notable promulgation of a code of conduct for European lawyers engaged
in cross-border practice, the CCBE Code.52

Whereas Rogers suggests we should analyze

international arbitration as if it were a society with a culture that promoted the values of its
justice system by implementing certain procedures within its tribunals, I suggest that we view
international arbitration as a commingling of the historically rooted legal systems of co-equal
sovereigns.
In this subsection, I argue first that differences in national ethical rules do not necessarily
reflect profound differences in the lawyer’s role. Then I argue that the variation in national
ethical codes can be largely credited to the different stages of historical development of the legal
profession across jurisdictions.

Finally, I argue that the procedural rules of international

arbitration reflect a compromise between these systems.
1.

The Cultural Divide Between Civil and Common Law Judicial Systems
Does Not Necessarily Reflect a Profound Difference in the Understanding
of the Lawyer’s Role.

The success of Rogers’ argument depends on the uniqueness of the lawyer’s role in a
given legal system. It is possible to maintain Rogers’ view that ethics rules are closely related to
procedural rules without concluding that different procedural rules reflect fundamentally
different conceptions of the lawyer’s role.
underdetermines the lawyer’s role.

This is because the procedural framework

The hybrid procedures of international arbitration are

51
Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 463 (2005) (surveying the development of legal ethics from 1904 through the present).
52
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE) published the CCBE Code in 1988. CCBE CODE OF
CONDUCT (1988) [hereinafter “the CCBE Code”]. See, Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics Code Part I:
An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1993) [hereinafter “Terry Part I”]; Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
European Community’s Legal Ethics Code Part II: Applying the the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 345 (1993) [hereinafter
“Terry Part II”]. See also John Toulmin Q.C., A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 673 (1992)
(discussing the CCBE code in connection with the possibility for an international code of professional ethics).
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insufficient to hypothesize a wholly unique role for the lawyer in that context.
Even though the dichotomy between adversarial and inquisitorial systems has been
widely used to characterize the procedural differences between legal systems,53 lawyers’ roles
are not necessarily distinguishable along adversarial and inquisitorial lines. For example, one
scholar notes that the rift between the lawyer’s role in the “adversarial” and “inquisitorial”
systems is not as wide as one might think.54 In fact, a report prepared by Austrian lawyers
“suggests a completely reversed perspective with respect to these gross generalizations
concerning the role of the American lawyer and Austrian lawyer,” namely, that “the Austrian
lawyer ... is [the] vigorous advocate of the client’s interests ... whereas the lawyer from the
Anglo-American tradition puts the duty to find the truth at least as high, if not higher, than the
duty of loyalty to a client.”55
Furthermore, lawyer’s roles are fluid and changeable even within one system.

US

lawyers serve a variety of roles, including “civil advocate, adviser, prosecutor and lawyer for
governmental organizations.”56 Rogers does not explain why her functional approach describes
and prescribes the differences in ethical rules in the international arena, yet does not explain the
sometimes vast differences between states’ ethical rules within the domestic context of the US,
where, one would assume, the same cultural values would result in the same role for lawyers.57
In many European countries the roles played by the members of the legal profession differ
widely enough from one another that there are actually a variety of names for legal

53

Carrie Menkel-Meadows, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 125 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
Terry Part I, supra note 51, at 49 n.194 (citing Professor Luban for the conclusion that “German lawyers [a]re really operating on an
adversary basis, notwithstanding the tradition comments about ‘inquisitorial systems’”).
55
Terry Part II, supra note 51, at 389–390.
56
Menkel-Meadows, supra note 53, at 126.
57
Vagts, supra note 3, at 678 (noting the tenacity of divergence among state ethical rules, despite long-standing model rules)
54
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professionals.58
There are, in any case, a diversity of viewpoints about the nature of the lawyers’ role—
among systems as well as under a given unitary procedural framework.

The best

characterization of the lawyer’s role in international arbitration is as manifesting a combination
of traits from different national systems.

Indeed, international arbitration has become

increasingly more American or adversarial59 as it has expanded and developed from its origins
as a private dispute mechanism among the “grand of men” of Europe.60 Rogers’ imposition of
the binary divide in her characterization of adversarial and inquisitorial systems belies an
adversarial way of thinking, and her goal of promulgating an original ethical code for arbitration
could itself be viewed as a reflection of this process of Americanization.61
2.

The Differences in Forms of National Codes of Professional Conduct Are
Relevant to Evaluating Professional Ethics in the International Sphere.

One of the assumptions Rogers makes in her proposal for a code of ethics in the context
of international arbitration is that lawyers hailing from different jurisdictions will share an
understanding of the form of professional ethics and that disagreement will only arise as to the
appropriate content of those rules. Codes of professional responsibility take different forms
across jurisdictions. For example, there are vast gaps in the specificity of professional rules
governing conflicts of interest. The US rules “are among the strictest in the world,”62 whereas
other nations’ rules mention conflicts only in the most general of terms, on the theory that
“conflicts are a matter of [personal] ethics, not law.”63 In France, for example, “the Code of

58

Terry Part I, supra note 51, at 10 (describing the variety of names for legal professionals used in European countries).
Karamanian, supra note 1; see also, Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the
Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1142 (1999) (noting
that the “‘judicialization’ of professional responsibility is a distinctive feature of the U.S. legal system”(emphasis added)).
60
Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at 958.
61
Menkel-Meadows, supra note 53, at 125 (“[T]he juxtaposition of adversarial to inquisitorial frameworks itself illustrates a primary
deficiency of adversarial thinking—an assumption of two presumed opposites.”)
62
Toulmin, supra note 52 at 681.
63
Daly supra note 59, at 1149 (quoting Justin Castillo, International Law Practice in the 1990s: Issues of Law, Policy, and Professional
59
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Conduct governing the notarial attorneys has no specific provisions on conflicts of interest. The
notarial attorney simply has to put the interest of his client before his own interest.”64
The cultural divide goes deeper than this however. The legal professions in jurisdictions
around the globe are at different stages of development with respect to the rules and standards of
ethical conduct. Some European countries have only general ethics guidelines, if they have any
codified ethics rules at all.65

Ever increasing transnational practice and the growth of

international arbitration may well encourage the development of more specific and codified
ethical rules in jurisdictions where those rules are as yet uncodified.
The ABA Model Rules and the CCBE Code each represent the current status of the
historical development of professional ethics in the US and the EU, respectively. One scholar
describes the progression of ethical rules over time as one from standards to rules of conduct.66
The US rules have developed further toward the rules end of the spectrum, as evidenced by a
level of specificity that European regulations have not yet achieved. The generality of the
European regulations is however not perceived as a deficiency.67 Indeed, Europeans do not want
or need more specific professional rules and regulations. Professor Hazard has reported that
“[t]he English barristers [think] it quaint that American lawyers [feel] in need of legal rules for

Ethics, 86 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 272, 283 (1992)).
64
Daly, supra note 59 at 1149 n.165 (quoting Olivier d'Ormesson, French Perspectives on the Duty of Loyalty: Comparisons with the
American View, in Rights, Liability, and Ethics).
65
Daly, supra note 59 at 1149–1150 & 1150 n.169 (noting that some countries rely on oral tradition for rules of professional conduct,
that the codes in France and Italy are much less specific than the US code of conduct, and that Mexico has no code of ethics at all); Terry, Part II,
supra note 52 at 384.
66
Daly, supra note 59, at 1124 (“Understanding the standards / rules dichotomy is an important first step in the creation of a crossborder code of lawyer conduct”).
67
Commentators have identified the benefits of general standards over specific rules with respect to the current EU regulations as well
as historical US regulations. Compare Terry Part I, supra note 52 at 16 (regarding current EU regulation, quoting the CCBE Compendium:
“Codes ... have limitations. They have more often more often a dissuasive effect than a positive impetus. ... They are attempts to capture on paper
an approved pattern of behavior, a desired moral climate, an answer to all questions of conduct – which cannot be adequately captured on
paper”), with Daly, supra note 59, at 1126 (describing the reasoning behind the “vague” standards of the 1908 Canons of Ethics, quoting the
Preamble: “no code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or in all
the relations of professional life”).
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their governance, but they recalled that Americans seemed to need rules for everything.”68
Professor Daly describes the historical development of the self-regulation of the
American legal profession as a steady movement away from an early reliance on the
interconnectedness within the “mini-communities” of lawyers within the profession for
regulation.69 Each of these subsections of the profession “had its own shared understandings of
the ethical standards governing its members” and functioned with a self-contained, largely
informal regulatory system.70 As the American legal progression expanded, diversified, and the
disciplinary mechanisms became more “regularized,” “professionalized,” and institutionalized,71
the demand for “clearer, more sharply framed directives”72 of professional conduct for lawyers
grew. The 1908 Canons of Ethics was surpassed by the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which gave way to the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.73
The development of the CCBE Code provides an interesting historical parallel to the
development of US domestic legal ethics. Professor Terry notes the ready comparison between
the 1977 Declaration of Perugia and the 1908 Canons of Legal Ethics,74 and the correlation
between the 1988 CCBE Code and the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.75 The
developments on both sides were motivated by similar changes in circumstances, including
greater diversification of the legal community and movement within it. A comment Justice
Stone’s made on the state of the American legal profession in 1934 could just as easily be
applied to the European legal profession in period before the promulgation of the CCBE code:

68

Daly, supra note 59, at 1121; Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 16.
Daly, supra note 59, at 1126.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1137.
72
Id. at 1128.
73
Id. at 1125–31 (describing the progression from canons to codes to rules).
74
Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 9.
75
Terry Part I, supra note 52 at 15–16 (“The concerns ... about the nature and shape of the CCBE Code mirror many of the same
concerns that appeared in the United States revolving around whether the approach of the Model Rules should be used in place of the established
Model Code approach,” but that while the CCBE provides “black letter rules” it is “‘leaner’ than the Model Rules”).
69
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“the petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our codes of
ethics ... Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an earlier era.”76
The drafters of the CCBE remarked that “rudimentary rules met simpler circumstances, more
refined and detailed rules now meet more complex circumstances.”77 Despite the strides made
by the EU toward a rules-based as opposed to standards-based framework for professional
conduct, the legal profession in Europe remains less institutionalized than in the US,78 and
regulation remains less regularized and professionalized.79
The state of affairs of ethical regulation in the practice of international arbitration stands
essentially at the same crossroads where the American legal profession found itself in the early
part of the century and which motivated the adoption by the European nations of the CCBE Code
in the early 1990s.80 International arbitration is no longer the “gentlemen’s club” run by a “cadre
of ‘grand old men’” that it used to be.81 Whereas “differences [among the ethical obligations
binding attorneys] were mute when international arbitration was run by a small group of
insiders,” the growth and diversification of the practice had rendered these differences
disruptive.82
Rogers’ theory simply does not account for the current divergence of the form of
professional rules across jurisdictions.

In order to truly level the playing field of ethical

regulation in international arbitration, we must account for differences in both the form and
content of national ethical regulation. It might be just as difficult for the British barrister to
76

Daly, supra note 59, at 1127 (citing Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934)).
Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 16 n.54 (quoting the CCBE Compendium).
78
Id. at 11 (referring to the “incomplete institutionalization of the legal profession in Europe”).
79
Daly, supra note 59 at 1160–1161 (noting that CCBE Code could be seen as a shift toward rules, but that the shift is in no way
wholehearted).
80
Cf. Abel, supra note 2, at 750 (“Transnational lawyers are significantly deprofessionalized. In this they increasingly resemble their
competitors in offices of house counsel and accounting firms, as well as their predecessors – lawyers before the emergence of strong professional
associations”).
81
Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at 959.
77
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adjust to myriad detailed ethical rules as it is for the German lawyer to adjust to a rule that
permitted him to prepare his witnesses for their testimony. The project of ascertaining which
ethics rules should apply to lawyers in the context of international arbitration must be informed
by the background of historical development of ethical rules in other contexts and the continued
divergence in the form of national professional ethics rules.
3.

Hybrid Procedures in International Arbitration Reflect Compromises
Between International Legal Systems.

Whereas Rogers argues that we should understand the hybrid procedures found in
international arbitration as a manifestation of the normative goals of that system, including
neutrality, effective resolution of disputes, and party autonomy, I agree with Professor Andreas
Lowenfeld that hybrid procedures are better understood as compromises between international
systems.

Professor Lowenfeld argues that procedures developed for use in international

arbitration represent the best of both the civil and common law worlds.83 He remarks that “many
of the techniques and approaches developed in one context are indeed portable, that is they are
capable of being adapted to use in different contexts and different fora from those for which they
were originally planned.”84 He further observes that the exchange of procedural ideas between
arbitration and litigation is a two-way street: Arbitration borrows procedure from litigation, but
litigation can also be influenced by procedures that have proved effective in arbitration.85
According to Lowenfeld, therefore, procedures don’t necessarily represent the underlying
normative goals of the international arbitration system, but rather, flow from an interactive
dialogue between the lawyers who each bring knowledge of their own procedural frameworks.
82

Rogers, supra note 3, at 357.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately Portable?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 649, 654 (“Altogether, I
think international arbitrators have gotten it about right - better than civil litigation in New York or Paris or Rome - without any treaty or
universal rules or other act of creation”).
84
Id. at 655.
85
Id. at 654 (noting that the arbitration practice of distributing witness statements in advance of testimony has been “adopted in
83
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Ultimately, international arbitration and international domestic legal systems reflect a certain
amount of convergence, generally in the direction of Americanization.86 The fact that the
International Bar Association’s Rules of Evidence for Arbitration provide for cross-examination,
some discovery by the parties,87 and testimony by party witnesses, reflects a “mild” form of
Americanization.88
By Rogers’ own estimation, international arbitration has become “more formalized and
legalized,” “judicialized,” and “sophisticated.”89

Given this fact in conjunction with the

evidence that arbitral procedures reflect measured compromises between national regimes, it is
no stretch to claim that arbitration has become tantamount to “offshore litigation.”90 Why, then,
shouldn’t the conflicts of laws approach we take to professional ethics other cross-border
practice seamlessly carry over to the international arbitration context?

The more similar

international arbitration and litigation become, the less need there is for a wholesale new
professional ethics code.

In light of Lowenfeld’s description of the procedural rules in

international arbitration as a compromise in progress, Rogers’ theory that the procedures of
international arbitration embody a fundamentally different role for the lawyer seems incorrect.
Under Rogers’ functional approach, the role of the lawyer is hard and fast and the
differences between the civil and common law legal systems are discernible and definitive. In
the context of the individual countries’ national legal professions, such narrowly defined roles
are hard to pin down, however. The ethics rules that Rogers claims express the lawyer’s role

American civil trials”).
86
Vagts, supra note 3, at 680 (“Internationally, one sees signs of a certain amount of convergence between systems as other countries
adjust their rules in the direction of the American norm”); Karamanian, supra note 2 (discussing the “Americanization” of international
arbitration).
87
Although, Lowenfeld insists that discovery in arbitration is much more limited, reflecting yet another compromise between the civil
and common law procedural systems. Lowenfeld, supra note 91, at 654.
88
Karamanian, supra note 1, at 10.
89
Rogers, supra note 3, at 353–54.
90
Id.
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seem to be more readily described in terms of the institutionalization and historical development
of the profession. The procedures that she argues provide the foundation for the lawyer’s role in
international arbitration represent a set of strategic compromises made between lawyers familiar
with different legal systems in an effort to facilitate adjudication. By describing international
arbitration in terms of its procedural development and by exposing the historical contingency of
the form of ethics codes, I have attempted to deprive Rogers’ theory of its central premise that
the lawyer’s role in international arbitration is unique and fundamentally different from her role
in national legal systems. If this is not the case, and if the lawyer’s role in international
arbitration is an amalgam of adversarial- and inquisitorial-style procedures that govern the
proceeding,91 there is no need to fabricate an ethics code for international arbitration out of
whole cloth. If the lawyer practicing international arbitration is simply a lawyer in a novel
venue,92 there is no reason that conflicts of laws principles, which have historically been used to
ascertain the ethics rules applicable to lawyers in novel venues, should not apply. The following
section argues that US and EU ethics codes currently affirmatively apply conflicts of laws to
international arbitration. The subsequent section argues that conflicts of laws should be used to
determine the applicable ethics rules in international arbitration.
B.

National Disciplinary Authorities Have Explicitly Invoked Conflicts of Law to
Address Issues Arising in Connection with International Arbitration.

National regulatory authorities have several bases of prescriptive jurisdiction which
permit them to regulate attorney conduct in international fora.93 The problem arises “when

91
Vagts, supra note 1, at 260 (“The way in which a case is tried before an international tribunal ... depends greatly on the composition
of the panel. It may come close to an Anglo-American adversarial model or may tend toward a civil law pattern”).
92
Block, supra note 8, at 21 (“The international arbitration bar is a glaring misnomer as the practitioners in the field are a random
collection of lawyers from around the world”); Smit, supra note 1, at 11 (“In international arbitration, parties frequently use the lawyers they
customarily use in their principle place of business, even if the arbitration takes place in another country”).
93
Vagts, supra note 3, at 689 (citing territoriality (states can regulate conduct of lawyers who act within their territory), nationality
(states can regulate conduct of lawyers who are their citizens), and effects (states can regulate conduct of lawyers who cause effects in their
territory)).
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multiple states have legitimate power to, and an interest in, regulating the same conduct.”94
Rogers identifies the problem as “a risk that an attorney will be subject to conflicting
obligations.”95 As noted above, I would re-characterize the problem as a lack of notice to the
lawyers as to which obligations they are subject to. Conflicts of law doctrine provides a method
to “identify and evaluate the competing policies behind different rules in order to determine
which should prevail.”96 This approach shares Rogers’ goal of leveling the playing field and
ensuring that all lawyers in a proceeding are subject to the same rules.97 The 2002 version of the
ABA Model Rule 8.5 and the CCBE Code both provide conflicts of laws rules that apply in case
of cross-border or international practice including international arbitration.
1.

ABA Model Rule 8.5 Applies a Conflicts of Law Approach to
Professional Ethics in the Context of International Arbitration.

As discussed above, the question practitioners in international arbitration must ask
themselves is: Which ethical rules must I abide by? The implied question is: If my conduct were
to become subject to a disciplinary proceeding, under what rules would it be evaluated?98 The
new version of ABA Model Rule 8.5 “Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law” answers this
question for lawyers engaged in international arbitration by providing “relatively simple, brightline rules”99 designed to “facilitate international law practice.”100 And, as long as it is clear to
practitioners what rules they will be held to account for at the end of the day, they will know

94

Rogers, supra note 6, at 23–24.
Id.
Vagts, supra note 3, at 678, 698 (discussing the application of common law conflicts of laws doctrine, including the 2d Restatement
test and governmental interest analysis as these approaches have been applied by courts in the context of malpractice suits).
97
Id. at 692, 690.
98
See supra note 47.
99
Daly, supra note 2, at 757.
100
Id.; See also, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002) (noting that the choice of law provision applies to
“transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected
jurisdictions provide otherwise.”); VAGTS, ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, 18–20 (2003)(commenting on the application of the
2002 version of Model Rul 8.5 to international practice).
95
96
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what rules to follow initially.101
The 2002 version of the Model Rule 8.5 embodies an interest analysis approach to
conflicts of law. Interest analysis holds that a particular law is applicable to a given factual
situation only if that factual situation implicates the purpose of the law.102 This purposive
approach would dictate, therefore, that a German rule prohibiting pre-testimonial
communications does not govern an arbitration proceeding in which procedural rules provide for
counsel to conduct direct and cross-examination of their witnesses. This is because the purpose
of the prohibition (maintenance of unadulterated evidence for the judge) is not promoted in a
proceeding where the lawyers are each required to present their versions of the facts by way of
witness examination.103 This example is discussed more fully below.
Each provision of Rule 8.5 reflects this purposive approach. The self-identified purpose
of the Model Rules is to define the relationship between lawyers and the legal system as part of
the self-government of the autonomous legal profession.104 The provision of Rule 8.5 governing
lawyer conduct other than in the context of a proceeding before a tribunal manifests an intent to
apply the rules of a jurisdiction only to conduct which implicates the relationship between
lawyers and the legal system in that jurisdiction. It premises application of a jurisdiction’s ethics
rules on contacts that are relevant to this relationship, namely the place of the lawyer’s conduct,
or the “predominant effect” of the conduct.105
Professor Daly has criticized the “predominant effect” standard in previous versions of

101
Cf. Daly, supra note 2, at 790 (regarding the prior version of the Model Rule: “it is not very useful for lawyers seeking guidance
about future conduct”).
102
Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-for Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989); see also, Industrial Indemnity Company v.
Chapman and Culter, 22 F. 3d 1346, 1350 (1994) (describing California’s governmental interest approach).
103
Thus, Rogers’ concern that conflicts of law might result in the application of an ethical rule that would not agree with the procedural
rules of an arbitration is unwarranted.
104
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, paras. 10, 12 & 13.
105
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (“for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.”)
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this Rule as vague and difficult to apply.106 The force of that critique is lessened by the addition
of a safety catch for lawyer’s conduct that “conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur” designed
to protect “lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.”107 Despite the fact that the
rule writers do not provide a “method” whereby lawyers could ascertain the jurisdiction of
predominant effect, as Daly would have liked,108 the writers seem to indicate that a lawyer’s
“reasonable” determination will be accepted. Indeed, Daly herself suggested the inclusion of a
“reasonableness requirement,” noting that “requiring reasonableness prevents lawyers from
taking advantage of their ability to ‘choose’.”109

Because the current version of Rule 8.5

relies on the place of conduct along with the reasonableness requirement, it is likely to lead to the
application of the rules of a state that has an interest in regulating that conduct. The place where
conduct that affects this relationship occurs has a greater interest in having its rules of ethics
apply than does the jurisdiction in which the lawyer happened to be licensed, for example, as
under the previous version of the Rule.
Lawyer conduct in international arbitrations will fall under the provision governing
conduct in connection with matters before tribunals. The historical choice of law rule of the situs
would apply the ethical rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal is located.

This is

articulated in Rule 8.5, which provides that “the rules of the jurisdiction in which a tribunal sits”
shall apply. As Rogers points out, it does not make sense for the ethics rules of a state that is
hosting an arbitration to apply merely because it is the situs of the arbitration.110 The Model

106

Daly, supra note 2, at 760.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) cmt. 3.
108
Daly, supra 2, at 760–61.
109
Daly, supra note 2, at 797.
110
Rogers, supra note 6, at 3.
107
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Rules account for this concern by further providing that the rules of the tribunal have preeminent
authority to designate which ethics rules shall apply.111 Rogers’ suggestion that arbitral tribunals
should promulgate full-fledged codes of ethics to regulate the lawyers who appear before them is
however unnecessary. In order to regulate the attorneys, arbitral tribunals need only provide a
choice of law rule which invokes extant regulatory systems where the purposes of those
regulations are implicated.
Rogers’ critique of the choice of law approach centers on her allegation that this approach
falsely views “ethical norms as freestanding precepts, which are independently modifiable and
interchangeable.”112 On my reading, the approach taken by the Model Rules does not view
“ethical norms as ... independently modifiable,” but rather recognizes the fact that rules of ethics
have specific purposes and should only be applied to lawyers’ conduct when those purposes are
implicated. The Model Rule 8.5 explicitly applies a conflicts of laws approach informed by
interest analysis to international arbitrations.
2.

The CCBE Code Applies a Conflicts of Laws Approach to Cross-border
Practice Including International Arbitration.

The CCBE Code operates slightly differently than the ABA Model Rules. Like Model
Rule 8.5, the CCBE Code applies to international arbitrations.113 Whereas the ABA Rules apply
primarily to domestic practice and have a few provisions that address multijurisdictional practice
(including international arbitration), the CCBE Code was designed solely to address issues
surrounding cross-border practice in Europe.114 Further, when the ABA Rules are adopted in
whole or in part by the individual states the Rules become the substantive content of that state’s

111
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (“the rules of the jurisdiction in which a tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise”).
112
Rogers, supra note 3, at 379.
113
See CCBE Code R. 4.5 “Extension to Arbitrators” that provides that “the rules governing a lawyer’s relations with the courts apply
also to his relations with arbitrators and any other persons exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, even on an occasional basis.”
114
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
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disciplinary system. On the other hand, a European state’s adoption of the CCBE Code merely
supplements the ethics rules and disciplinary system already in place in the adoptive state by
providing rules for cross-border practice. In this way, the whole of the CCBE code can be
loosely analogized to Model Rule 8.5.
Professor Terry characterizes the Code as one which provides a series of conflicts of laws
rules indicating which national ethics rules should apply, rather than setting forth a “universally
acceptable ‘legal ethics’ code.”115

The Code was intended to prevent the simultaneous

application of conflicting ethical rules (“double deontology”), without necessarily “adopting a
particular substantive position” (“single deontology”).116

The CCBE Code provisions on

“incompatible occupations,” “advertising,” and “confidentiality of communications between
lawyers” provide such conflicts of laws guidance that directs lawyers to follow a given state’s
rule under specified circumstances instead of dictating a new rule.117 Other provisions, for
example, that on ex parte communications, combine a substantive component with a choice of
law rule. This rule forbids ex parte communications “unless [they] ... are permitted under the
relevant rules of procedure.”118 In a manner similar to that of the Rule 8.5 provision that defers
to the rules of the tribunal, the CCBE Code incorporates the principles underlying interest
analysis by recognizing that a tribunal before which a lawyer appears has a greater interest in
regulating the conduct of that lawyer than does the state.119
The CCBE Code likewise applies its conflicts of law approach to determining which

115
Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 18. See also, Vagts, supra note 3, at 678 n.5 (noting that the CCBE Code “turns out to contain many
instances in which it in effect resorts to conflict of laws solutions rather than providing uniform rules”).
116
Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 18.
117
Id. at 25.
118
Id. at 37.
119
The CCBE Code, R. 4.1. (“A lawyer who appears, or takes part in a case before a court or tribunal in a Member State, must comply
with the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.”)de4
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rules of professional conduct should apply to international arbitration.120 A hint of interest
analysis is apparent in certain rules of the Code that seek to level the playing field between
lawyers from jurisdictions which may have more specific and restrictive rules and those from
jurisdictions with less restrictive rules. For example, the CCBE Code rule governing conflicts of
interest is surprisingly strict, given the vagueness or non-existence of conflicts of interest rules in
many of the CCBE member states.121 In an cross-border arbitration in which the parties were
represented by a lawyer from a jurisdiction with a specific conflicts of interest rule and a lawyer
from a jurisdiction with a vague conflicts of interest rule, the CCBE Rule would govern so that
these lawyers could be prevented from representing their clients in the event of a conflict even if
their national rule would not have prevented the representation. In terms of interest analysis, the
CCBE prioritizes the states’ interest in preventing conflicts over the interest in promoting
freedom of representation. The restrictive rule guarantees that in all cases, the state interest in
preventing conflicts is upheld. In sum, the CCBE Code applies a conflicts of law approach that
incorporates the competing regulatory interests of the European nations to cross-border practice,
including international arbitration.
3.

Conflicts of Laws Rules for Professional Ethics in International
Arbitration Should Be Decided by the Tribunals.

Given that national regulation, including the ABA Model Rules122 and the CCBE Code,
apply choice of law rules to lawyer conduct in the context of international arbitration, the next
question is: Which choice of law rules should be followed? For example, in an international
arbitration proceeding between German and American parties, held in Geneva, which choice of
120
The CCBE Code, Rule 4.5 extends the application of all provisions referring to “courts” to arbitrations and other “judicial or quasijudicial” institutions.
121
Terry, Part I, supra note 52, at 31, and 31 n. 118.
122
The practical matter of application of the Model Rules depends, of course, on whether the individual states have adopted those
Rules. The adoption of the current Model Rule 8.5 in New York is still pending, and the rule currently in force in that state corresponds to the
prior version of the rule. See ABA “State Implementation of Model Rule 8.5," http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/8_5_quick_guide.pdf; ABA Ad
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law rules determine the ethics rules that will apply—the CCBE Code or Model Rule 8.5? The
companion inquiry is: Who should best decide?
Private international adjudication, due to the fact that it implicates the regulatory interests
of multiple sovereigns, will inevitably encounter conflicting regulations. The real problem with
conflicts of law is not resolving these conflicts but rather the potential for diversity in the
approaches to the rules for resolving them.

In order to obtain certainty, uniformity, and

predictability, and to provide lawyers with notice as to the applicable ethical rules, arbitral
tribunals must be clear in their application of choice of law rules. In the same way that the
CCBE Code has “harmonized the ‘conflicts of laws’ choices facing a lawyer” engaged in crossborder practice in Europe, international arbitration needs to harmonize and clarify the application
of conflict of laws rules so that all lawyers involved in the same arbitral proceeding will be
governed by the same ethical regulations.123
As to the question of which conflicts of laws rules should be applied, there are a variety
of possible answers. As discussed above, the Model Rules and the CCBE Code each provide
approaches to conflicts issues. Arbitrators have the authority to develop and apply conflicts of
laws rules. This authority comports fully with their adjudicatory role. Furthermore, given the
deference of national ethics rules to rules of specific tribunals, arbitrator authority to determine
conflicts of laws rules does not undermine the regulatory interests of the nations whose lawyers
practice before those tribunals. The comment to Model Rule 8.5 supports placing the authority
to determine choice of law rules with the tribunal insofar as it anticipates and defers to the
tribunal’s choice of law rule: “The lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in

Hoc Comm. on Multijurisdictional Practice, Approved by the Executive Comm. NYCLA, Report of January 29, 2001; NY CLS Jud. Appx Code
Prof’l Resp. § 1200.5-a, DR 1-105 (2005).
123
Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 45.
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which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide
otherwise.”124 Also, a choice of law determination by the arbitral tribunal would indicate to the
relevant nationally based disciplinary authority the standards against which the lawyer’s conduct
should be measured in the event of a disciplinary proceeding.
There is precedent for allowing an arbitral tribunal to develop a conflicts of law rule in
the context of the application of substantive law. A tribunal’s choice of law determination can
either be invoked on an ad hoc basis, or it can be built into the rules of the tribunal. Certain
tribunals exemplify the ad hoc approach by allowing the arbitrator to determine which law will
govern in the event the party’s agreement does not specify the governing law.125 ICSID provides
an example where the rules of the arbitral tribunal stipulate the choice of law rule: “[A]rticle
42(1) of the ICSID rules mandates that, in the absence of party agreement, the arbitrators apply
the ‘law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its conflict-of-laws) and such
rules of international law as may be applicable’.”126
In sum, national ethics rules do apply to lawyer conduct in the context of international
arbitration. It is consistent with the structure of arbitration proceedings to apply conflicts of laws
rules to determine which ethics rules should apply to the conduct of the lawyers in the
proceeding. Arbitral tribunals have the authority to make such conflicts determinations, and
national rules make clear that disciplinary authorities will defer to such determinations in any
subsequent disciplinary action against an attorney.

In this way, lawyers practicing in

international arbitration will benefit from the transparency and accessibility of rules specific to
the tribunal and the equity and fairness of complying with the same ethics rules with which their
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 4.
Rogers, supra note 3, at 421 n.382 (citing W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (1997)).
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colleagues comply.
C.

The Conflicts of Laws Approach to Ethical Regulation in International Arbitration
Respects Both the Coequal Sovereignty of National Disciplinary Authorities and
the Independence of the Legal Profession.

It is important to remember that the tribunals of the international arbitration system are
not international or supranational courts.127 They are privately administrated bodies that provide
private dispute resolution to, in large part, private parties. One of the reasons that arbitration is
such a highly prized form of dispute settlement is that national sovereigns respect the private
nature of these tribunals by enforcing awards made by them largely without question.128 Despite
this, national sovereigns nevertheless maintain an interest in regulating the professional conduct
of their lawyers practicing in private international adjudication.129 Ethical regulation in the
context of international arbitration must account for the coequal sovereignty of the nations
implicated in the arbitration as well as the independence of the legal professions of those nations.
The principle of coequal sovereignty of nations is critical to the international legal sphere,
including arbitration. Rogers asserts that “the goals of ethical regulation are to guide, punish,
and deter attorney conduct in an effort to protect clients and third parties, and to ensure the
proper functioning of the state adjudicatory apparatus.”130 These goals are equally important and
equally well-served by the application of state rules of ethics to lawyer conduct, regardless of
whether the conduct is in the context of a domestic court, a domestic arbitration, or an
international arbitration. The very nature of our federalist system at the domestic level and the

127
128

Id. at 342.
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330

U.N.T.S. 38.
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Rogers, supra note 6, at 4 (“nation-states retain an interest in the regulation of the behavior of lawyers who are licensed in their
jurisdictions and whose work affects the rights and obligations of their citizens”)
130
Rogers, supra note 6, at 20 n.93 (quoting Joint Committee on Prof’l Discipline: ‘The purpose of lawyer discipline ... is to maintain
appropriate standards of professional conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated
by their conduct that they are unable to likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional duties”).
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system of Westphalian sovereignty at the international level allows for varied, conflicting, and
from time to time completely incompatible ethical rules.

The “coexistence” of national

regulatory systems is simply part and parcel of the relations among nations on the international
plane. If international arbitration is viewed as an example of the interaction of sovereign nations
there is no way – feasible or desirable – to devise a way of avoiding conflicts between ethical
rules that apply to the lawyers practicing in it. Even as the ABA Multijurisdictional Practice
Commission prepared the new version of Model Rule 8.5 in an attempt to facilitate the evergrowing interstate practice, it “reaffirm[ed] the principle of state judicial regulation of
lawyers.”131 Both the ABA and the CCBE have provided tools to resolve inconsistencies in the
interstate and inter-European context that deliberately allow for various interests of the
disciplinary authorities to be accommodated.
International tribunals do not have an interest in regulating attorney conduct,132 rather
they merely have an interest in the fairness and equity of their proceedings. That interest can be
satisfactorily fulfilled by invoking extant national rules and mechanisms through application of
conflicts of laws principles.133 Where Rogers’ observes that the tribunal is in the best position to
discipline the lawyers before it because it is best acquainted with their conduct makes intuitive
sense, Professor Vagts notes that the apparent practical convenience is illusory in that
“[e]xercising that power [to discipline] might ... be diversionary and counterproductive.”134
The way in which Rogers’ functional approach contravenes the coequal sovereignty of
nations can be best illustrated in terms of her proposed enforcement mechanism. In “Context

131

ABA Comm. on Multijurisdictional Practice, Report of August, 2002 at 6, http://www.acca.com/advocacy/mjp/finalmjp.pdf.
This is not to say that an arbitral tribunal does not have an interest in having regulated attorneys appear before it, but simply that the
tribunal’s interest does not extend to providing that regulation itself.
133
As discussed above, in contrast to Rogers’ repeated assertion that “international arbitration is intentionally disassociated from
sovereigns, [so that] there is no obvious source for regulating participating attorneys,” the current national rules expose a clear intention on the
part of national regulatory authorities to extend the application of their rule to international arbitration. Rogers, supra note 6, at 2.
134
Vagts, supra note 1, at 253. Contrast with Rogers’ assertion that “The fact that international arbitration is a private system does
nothing to diminish [its] inherent need” to have the “tools” and “power” to regulate the attorneys before them.” Rogers, supra note 6, at 24.
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and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for
International Arbitration, ”135 Rogers argues that the functional approach should lead to ethical
rules promulgated and enforce by the arbitral tribunals themselves. That enforcement should
take the form of disciplinary “sanctions” and published reprimands. Under this regime, the
arbitral tribunal, an organization with no international personality or sovereign authority, would
effectively govern the conduct of citizens whose conduct is already regulated by their
professional organizations. As I argued above, there is nothing fundamentally different about a
lawyer’s international arbitration practice to warrant its exemption from the usual professional
regulation. Rogers’ recommendation would displace sovereign regulation of lawyer conduct
with a private regime under the sole authority of the arbitral tribunals. On the other hand,
application of conflicts of laws rules to ethics in arbitral proceedings incorporates the sovereign
authority of the nation of each lawyer’s citizenship by maintaining nationally based lawyer
regulation. Conflicts of laws seeks to ensure that national regulations are invoked when the
sovereign’s regulatory interest is implicated.
A conflicts of laws approach likewise respects the independence of the legal profession—
a long-held and essential value of bars around the world.136 Organized bars promulgate rules of
professional conduct for the very purpose of maintaining their independence.137 The very fact of
the “professionalism” of the bar is intimately connected with its capacity of self-regulation.138
Professor Daly invoked these principles in an unequivocal argument against a proposal for a
unitary national bar association in place of the current state bar system:
“As a matter of policy, the proposal for a national bar threatens the independence
135

Rogers, supra note 6.
Rogers, supra note 3, at 365–67; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble.
Daly, supra note 2, at 749.
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of the legal profession and should be rejected on this basis alone. State-based
regulation preserves liberty. . . . The creation of a national bar would . . . lessen[]
the protection of individual liberty.”139
The independence of the legal profession must likewise be maintained in the context of
private international adjudication. Application of conflicts of law to ethics rules in international
arbitration supports and furthers the independence of the national bars by maintaining nationally
based lawyer regulation. By contrast, Rogers’ recommendation that international arbitrators
should double as a disciplinary authorities and“sanction” attorney conduct that does not comply
with the ethics rules promulgated by that tribunal completely contravenes this principle of
independence.140

Involving an adjudicator as a ground floor disciplinarian threatens both

sovereign regulatory authority of the lawyers respective nations and also the independence of
legal profession.
In this Part, I argued that the role of the lawyer in international arbitration is not
fundamentally different from that her role in other contexts, as Rogers claims. I conclude, in
contrast to Rogers, that the national ethical regulations should apply to international arbitration.
I have demonstrated that national rules explicitly do apply to international arbitration and that
they call for a conflicts of laws approach in that context. I have argued furthermore that conflicts
of law incorporates the essential principles of coequal sovereignty of nations and the
independence of the legal profession, whereas Rogers’ approach contravenes these principles.
III.

The Conflicts of Law Approach to Rule of Professional Conduct Is Practicable.
This final Part attempts to apply the conflicts of laws principles delineated above to a few

different factual scenarios.141 These hypothetical examples will illustrate the ways in which a
conflicts of laws approach furthers the interests of the national regulatory authorities, the arbitral
139
140

Daly, supra note 2, at 784 (emphasis added).
Rogers, supra note 6, at 3–4.
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tribunals and the lawyers themselves. The examples should expose not only the complexity of
conflicts of laws but the ultimate workability of the approach.142
A.

Interstate Conflicts of Rules of Ethics Provide a Familiar Starting Point for
Conflicts of Laws Analysis.

I begin with an example of an interstate conflict143 to juxtapose against the international
examples in an attempt to expose the fundamental similarity in application of conflicts of law,
regardless of whether the conflict is between states or nations.
A law firm, “S & H” is based in New York and has a branch office in New Jersey for the
sole purpose of providing services to a principle client, DX, a Delaware corporation which has
its principle place of operations in New Jersey. S & H has one partner, who is admitted both in
New York and New Jersey, and three associates based at the New Jersey branch. Two of the
associates are admitted both in New York and New Jersey, and one is admitted only in New
York. S & H transfers a second partner, admitted in California, to the office. DX reveals fraud it
has committed to the partner in charge of its account. The California rule would prohibit
disclosure, the New Jersey rule would require disclosure under certain circumstances and New
York rule would either prohibit disclosure or leave it to the lawyer’s discretion under certain
circumstances.

The question is, of course: “Which jurisdiction's ethical rules govern the

lawyers’ conduct?”144
Daly’s analysis and conclusion that the previous version of Model Rule 8.5 is wholly
“unworkable” is based in large part on the centrality of the lawyer’s place of admission and
141

I have borrowed these hypotheticals from Professors Rogers, Daly and Vagts.
Cf. Jay L. Krystinik, Comment: The Complex Web of Conflicting Disciplinary Standards in Litigation, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 815, 827
n.121 (2003) (citing Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts of Law – State or Federal?, 68 IND. J. L. 907, 911 (1993)) (“Those of us who study conflicts must
regret that it is law frequently unpopular with lawyers, judges, law students, and even law professors .... Chief among the reasons must be the
daunting nature of the subject: difficulties in framing issues, in deciding between complex and, at times, contradictory approaches to a solution,
and in applying the approach selected to the facts of the case.”).
143
This example is borrowed from Professor Daly. I’ve abbreviated the facts. Daly, supra note 2, at 717.
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principle place of practice to the section of the rule governing conduct not related to a court
proceeding.145 These criticisms are no longer applicable under the new formation of the rule,
which premises jurisdiction on the place of conduct. Her further contention that the lawyer
attempting to ascertain place of the predominant effect of his conduct “has no assurance that
either formula will be ultimately acceptable to the disciplinary authorities” has also been
remedied under the new formula through the “reasonableness” safeguard provision, as discussed
above at Part II(B)(1).146
The S & H lawyers’ evaluation of whether they must disclose DX’s fraud is undoubtedly
a difficult task, but not an impossible one. The first step of the application of Model Rule 8.5, is
to determine whether the conduct is in connection with a matter before a tribunal. It seems not to
be. Therefore, the second step falls under section 8.5(b)(2) governing conduct not related to a
court proceeding. That section requires that the lawyers pinpoint the place of conduct. The
partner to whom the fraud was revealed must evaluate where the relevant conduct—in this case
disclosure of the fraud—would occur. Probably the answer is New York or New Jersey, given
that those are the jurisdictions in which this partner practices. The next step is to determine
whether the disclosure would take predominant effect in a jurisdiction other than New York or
New Jersey. As Daly reasons, the disclosure would likely have effects in all the states in which
DX did business and so it is impossible to ascertain a place of predominant effect.147 I would
counter that given the partner’s intimate knowledge of DX’s operations, as well as the details of
the fraud, that partner is probably in a position to make a reasonable determination as to the
place where his disclosure of the company fraud would have its predominant effect. The answer

144

Id. at 776.
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might be New Jersey (DX’s primary place of operations), and it might be New York (the primary
place of business of the banks affected by the fraud).
Ultimately, the question of whether the lawyer gets the answer right is made eminently
less critical by the reasonable basis provision of the new Model Rule. Provided that the S & H
attorneys approach the inquiry in good faith and formulate a reasonable basis for their ultimate
decision as to the applicable rules, they will have assurance that any disciplinary authority that
might eventually be confronted with their situation would apply those rules to their conduct.
This example further illustrates the way in which the new Rule 8.5 captures a conflicts of
law approach founded in interest analysis. Although multiple states will be effected by the
disclosure, or lack thereof, and therefore have an interest in applying their rule, the “predominant
effect” standard seeks out the state with the greatest interest. The lawyer is the person in the best
position to make this determination because she can assess the consequences of disclosing the
fraud in the context of everything she knows about the client matter. It is therefore adventitious
to assign the lawyer the tast of making this determination.
B.

International Conflicts Are Strikingly Similar to Interstate Conflicts.

Interestingly, Professor Vagts proposes nearly the same hypothetical in an international
context.148 In his scenario, an American lawyer working in the German office of an American
firm discovers a client’s plan to commit fraud. The German rule would require disclosure, and,
as we saw in the preceding example, the American rules on the subject differ wildly. Elsewhere,
Vagts notes that “the German lawyer’s duty to report is contained within a provision that relates
to obligations of all Germans to assist in the forestalling of crime.”149 Under interest analysis,

148
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Detlev Vagts, International Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 92 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 378, 379 (1998).
Vagts, supra note 3, at 687.
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then, the German rule would not apply to this American lawyer. The conduct of an American
lawyer working for an American law firm does not implicate the purpose of the rule, which is to
govern the conduct of German citizens within the German political community. If the disclosure
of the client’s fraud can be characterized as a matter of cross-border EU practice, the CCBE
Code might apply. In this case Rule 2.3, “Confidentiality,” unambiguously militates against
disclosure of the fraud, as of any other client confidence.150
As one commentator observed, “[t]he discussion of which rules to apply becomes
somewhat academic when one considers that the jurisdiction best able – and most likely – to
pursue disciplinary action is the lawyer’s home jurisdiction.”151

It is certainly possible to

imagine that if the lawyer did make the disclosure, a disciplinary action might well be brought in
the US before a state disciplinary committee that had adopted Model Rule 8.5. In this case, the
lawyer could either argue that the rules of the jurisdiction where he made the disclosure, namely
Germany, required that he do so, rendering the conduct permissible under the “place of conduct”
provision of Rule 8.5.

In the alternative, he could argue that he reasonably believed the

predominant effect of the disclosure would occur in a jurisdiction that required the disclosure
(whether that jurisdiction was New York or some other state). Again, as long as the lawyer
considered the factors and structured his conduct to comply with the regulations that he
reasonably determined should apply, the lawyer should be able to rest assured that he is immune
from disciplinary action.
C.

Conflicts in International Arbitration: Pre-trial Communication with Witnesses.

The two proceeding examples were intended to lay the groundwork for the application of
conflicts of laws doctrine to ethics rules, I will now address a few examples specific to

150
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international arbitration. First, Rogers’ “paradigmatic” conflict, introduced above, summarized
neatly as the “witness preparation/tampering” issue.152

Significantly, this issue has been

addressed by the International Bar Association as part of their “Rules on the Taking of Evidence
in International Commercial Arbitration.”153 Specifically, Rule 4.3 provides: “It shall not be
improper for a Party, its officers, employees, legal advisors or other representatives to interview
its witnesses or potential witnesses.”154 This example sheds some light on a common sense
solution to the purported problem of conflict between ethics and procedural rules. Clearly, if the
rules of the tribunal provide for preparation of witnesses by attorneys, it should not contravene
the ethics rules of any relevant jurisdiction for attorneys before that tribunal to do so. The
combined effect of either the CCBE Code155 or Model Rule 8.5 and the IBA evidence rules will
allow both the civil law and the common law lawyer to engage in strategic pre-testimonial
communication with their respective witnesses in a fully ethical manner. By standardizing this
evidence rule applicable to international arbitration, the IBA has effectively harmonized the
ethics rules regarding pre-testimonial communication with witnesses as well.
The principles underlying conflicts of law interest analysis provide a ready justification
for resolving conflicts of ethics rules through the backdoor of procedural or evidentiary rules.
The two regulatory bodies allegedly competing for prescriptive jurisdiction are the state156
(which promulgated the ethical rule) and the arbitral tribunal (which promulgated the evidentiary
rule).

Let’s assume that the arbitration takes place in a civil law jurisdiction where pre-

testimonial communications are prohibited, but that the rules of the tribunal permit these
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communications. Can a lawyer, hailing from a civil law jurisdiction that likewise prohibits pretestimonial communications, ethically take depositions and interview witnesses prior to the
hearing? The first step in interest analysis is to look to the purposes of the laws of each
regulatory entity. The purpose of the state’s law prohibiting pre-testimonial communications is
to maintain an untainted base of evidence to facilitate fact finding by the inquisitorial judge.157
The state’s interest, therefore, extends only to attorneys who are participating in the type of
inquisitorial proceeding implicated by the rule. The arbitration proceeding, by its own definition,
is not such an inquisitorial setting. Therefore, the state has no interest in preventing lawyers
appearing before that tribunal from interviewing their witnesses before the fact. This situation
presents the classic “false conflict” where only one regulatory entity – in this case the arbitral
tribunal – has an interest in having its rule apply to the case.158
The only remaining issue is the practical question of whether lawyers from different
backgrounds and training will prepare their witnesses equally well or in the same qualitative
way.159 Rogers recognizes this also, but claims that a “controlling rule” will bring different
lawyers’ practice styles into alignment.160 Her conclusion that a uniform ethics code will create
such alignment seems to underestimate the pervasive cultural differences among lawyers
internationally.

As one practitioner stated: “Although it may be hard for lawyers in some

jurisdictions to get used to this, at least the rule is clear.”161 This comment expresses the
important idea that homogenizing the differences in practice styles among lawyers of vastly
different education and experience takes much more than a rule of conduct. One of the essential
features of international arbitration is that it is international. Lawyers from different traditions
157
Rogers, supra note 3, at 399 (noting that the prohibition on pre-testimonial communications reflects the lawyer’s role, not a
tolerance for perjury).
158
Kramer, supra note 102, at 1045.
159
Block, supra note 8, at 18.
160
Rogers, supra note 3, at 360 n.85
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represent opposing parties and have different ways of thinking about litigation. I do not mean to
declare the problem of conflicting ethical obligations insoluble, but merely to emphasize that a
conflicts of law approach incorporates this reality, by respecting the regulatory authority of the
implicated states while still allowing the tribunals’ ability to shape the conduct of lawyers in
their proceedings.
D.

Conflicts in International Arbitration: Ex Parte Communications.

I take up Rogers’ example of ex parte communications with arbitrators as a final
illustration of the conflicts of law approach in action.162 An American and a European represent
opposing sides before an arbitral panel composed of two party-appointed and one neutral
arbitrator in a proceeding under Swiss law. The question is “whether it is permissible for the
lawyer for one of the parties to the arbitration to communicate ex parte with the arbitrator whom
that party appointed.”163
A conflicts of laws rule which applied the ethics rules of the situs of the tribunal would
result in the application of the civil law rule allowing ex parte communications. Interest analysis
would look to the purpose of the American rule prohibiting ex parte communications: to prevent
one side from gaining an unfair advantage.164 If the structure of the proceeding is intended to
equip each side with an advocate on the arbitral panel and maintain the neutrality of the third
panelist, then the purpose of the US rule is only implicated with respect to ex parte
communications with the neutral arbitrator. The US rule would not bar communications with the
party-appointed arbitrators. Furthermore, under the situs rule, the US lawyer would be fully
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justified in engaging in such ex parte communications under the ABA Model Rule 8.5, as she
would be complying with the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits.165
The practice has developed in the opposite direction, however. Ex parte communications
are “not the norm in international arbitration.”166 Several organizations that issue arbitration
rules and guidelines have come down on the side prohibiting ex parte communications and,
therefore, encouraging the neutrality of all arbitrators.167 The CCBE Code has also resolved this
conflict in favor of prohibiting ex parte communications, except where they are permitted “under
the relevant rules of procedure.”168
Professor Menkel-Meadows refers to this situation as a “conflict of role.”169 Whereas
Rogers’ functional approach emphasizes the derivation of the ethics rule from the role of the
lawyer in a given procedural framework, this example of ex parte communications betrays the
fact that the rub might actually be in ascertaining the role in the first place. The debate about ex
parte communications with party-appointed arbitrators exposes differing views about whether
arbitrators should properly serve a partisan or a neutral role. The counterpart to this debate
regards the lawyer’s role and the extent to which the lawyer should advocate before a neutral
panel or work with a member of that panel as a team – conflict of role, indeed. As international
arbitration grows and develops the roles lawyers play before its tribunals will surely develop and
change as well. As procedural and evidentiary rules are drafted and revised, they will reflect
these developments in the notions of the lawyer’s role. The conflicts among ethical rules can be
best resolved by weighing the interests of the relevant regulatory authorities in the context of the
particular procedural and evidentiary rules of an international proceeding.
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Conclusion
Catherine Rogers’ article “Fit and Function” provides a novel approach to the analysis of
conflicting rules of professional conduct in the context of international arbitration. Her analysis
of the interconnectedness of procedural rules, ethics and the lawyer’s role falls short, however, of
compelling her recommendation that a code of ethics be developed especially for international
arbitration. I have argued that differing ethical rules across jurisdictions do not necessarily
indicate fundamentally different roles of the lawyers in those jurisdictions. Ethical rules are
partly a function of the development of the legal profession over time.

Further, lawyers

practicing in international arbitration do not take on a profoundly different role in that context.
They bring their culturally specific professional outlook with them and the conflicts among
ethical standards that arise in this setting are a necessary part of the continued development and
professionalization of international arbitration. A conflicts of laws approach to ethical dilemmas
in international arbitration incorporates these complexities and accounts for the coequal
sovereignty of the regulating states and the independence of the legal profession. Application of
conflicts of laws principles to resolve the ethical dilemmas that arise in the context of
international arbitration will ensure that the standards for professional conduct in this venue
support its reputation as a neutral and efficient method of adjudication that furthers both party
and state interests.

